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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
______________
No. 12-2025
______________
DENNIS C. O’BRIEN,
Appellant
v.
ARCHABBOT DOUGLAS NOWICKI;
JACK PERRY;
SAINT VINCENT ARCHABBEY,
an unincorporated association
______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 2-11-cv-00979)
Honorable Terrence F. McVerry, District Judge
______________
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
December 13, 2012
BEFORE: GREENAWAY, JR., GREENBERG, and COWEN, Circuit Judges
(Filed: January 9, 2013)
______________
OPINION OF THE COURT
______________
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge.
This matter comes on before this Court on an appeal from an order of the District
Court entered on March 14, 2012, adopting a report and recommendation of a magistrate

judge dated January 27, 2012, as its opinion and granting defendants’ motion to dismiss.
Plaintiff, now appellant, Dennis C. O’Brien, a citizen of California, brought this action
against Archabbot Douglas Nowicki, Jack Perry, and Saint Vincent Archabbey, citizens
of Pennsylvania, in the District Court for the Northern District of California but that court
transferred the action to the Western District of Pennsylvania. The case is predicated on
O’Brien’s allegation that from August 1966 until May 1970, a period in which he was a
student at Saint Vincent Scholasticate, a boarding high school, in Latrobe, Pennsylvania,
he was subjected to sexual abuse, the consequences of which still affect him. Though
O’Brien does not seek a recovery on the basis of the alleged abuse he suffered as a
student, he does seek damages on theories of negligence, recklessness and fraud in the
implementation of a counseling and assistance program formulated by the Archabbey to
assist persons who had been victims of sexual abuse in the Archabbey’s operations.
O’Brien included Perry as a defendant because he was the Archabbey’s Delegate for
Child Protection and became involved in O’Brien’s case when he sought assistance from
the program.
After the California district court transferred the case to the Western District of
Pennsylvania, the District Court referred to a magistrate judge who considered and
recommended granting a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) that the
defendants, now appellees, had filed. In the magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation, she cited Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 556-57, 127
S.Ct. 1955, 1965-66 (2007), and other cases for the point that a motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(6) must be granted if a complaint does not set forth a claim for relief that is
2

plausible on its face or does not allow a court to draw a reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for his alleged misconduct. The magistrate judge then went on to
explain that O’Brien did not contend that defendants were liable for his abuse as a
student, as any such claim would have been barred by the statute of limitations. Rather,
he contended that they were liable for breach of a present duty for their actions in the
implementation of their current assistance program in which he had participated. 1
In the course of her report and recommendation the magistrate judge made the
following astute observation:
The Court observes the public policy considerations weighing strongly
against imposing liability on private organizations electing to afford
gratuitous assistance and/or remediation to alleged victims of otherwise
time-barred wrongs. If by proffering a gratuitous, measured response an
institution exposed itself to legal liability premised on second-guessing the
nature of its investigation or remediation, the effect would be chilling, if not
preclusive.
Sup. App. at 6.
Of course, the magistrate judge, in addition to setting forth the above policy
considerations weighing against O’Brien’s action, also carefully considered his claims on
a strictly legal basis. Ultimately she concluded that defendants “owed (a) no general duty
as to the claims alleged and (b) no particularized duties to [O’Brien] other than those
arising from his attendance as a student forty (40) years ago – as to which the statute of
limitations has long expired.” Thus, she recommended that the District Court grant
defendant’s motion to dismiss.

In his brief O’Brien agrees with the magistrate judge, that, if he made any direct claim
for child abuse, the statute of limitations would have barred the claim.
1
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The magistrate judge’s report and recommendation was referred to the District
Court and O’Brien filed timely objections to it. The Court, after considering the entire
record, adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation as its own opinion and
granted the motion to dismiss. This appeal followed. The District Court had jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 2 We exercise
plenary review on this appeal. 3
After our plenary review of this matter we are in full accord with the magistrate
judge and thus, by extension, the District Court and have very little to add to their
opinion. 4 See Nichole Med. Equip. & Supply, Inc. v. Tricenturion, Inc., 694 F.3d 340,
350 (3d Cir. 2012). We note, however, that regardless of how a counseling program is
established it always would be possible to challenge aspects of it. Furthermore, we
In point of fact O’Brien did not allege that he is a citizen of California and defendants
are citizens of Pennsylvania. Rather, he pleaded that they were residents of their
respective states. Of course, citizenship and residency are not synonymous. See
Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 338-39, 103 S.Ct. 1838, 1847-48 (1983). Thus, in
view of our obligation to satisfy ourselves that the District Court had jurisdiction we
would be justified if we dismissed this appeal and remanded the case to the District Court
with instructions that it dismiss the action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332; Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau
v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 905 F.2d 42, 45 (3d Cir. 1990). Nevertheless, we are not
doing so as we are satisfied from our review of the case that the parties are citizens of
their states of residence.
2

We are surprised that O’Brien in his brief indicates that “[r]eview by the Court of
Appeals is not a trial de novo. Appellant must demonstrate that the lower court decision
was an obvious error, a misapplication of the law and/or an abuse of discretion.”
Appellant’s br. at 8. Thus, he places a higher burden on himself than the cases require.
Of course, we apply the correct standard of review on this appeal.
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O’Brien includes the following sentence in his brief. “He has attempted to be as clear
and concise as possible and requests that the Court read the brief entirely and analyze the
issues fully before rendering its decision.” Appellant’s br. at 1. Of course, the parties
may be certain that we have done exactly that.

4
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observe that O’Brien’s participation in the program was entirely voluntary and he was
free to withdraw from it at any time. Moreover, we reiterate and expand on the District
Court opinion and point out that, if we permit this matter to proceed, institutions such as
the Archabbey will be reluctant to establish programs such as that involved here and
expose themselves to litigation with respect to the design or implementation of the
programs. 5
We make a final but important point. We recognize that institutions such as the
Archabbey might establish a counseling program in the hope of avoiding litigation by
diverting a potential claimant into the program. We, however, are not concerned with
such a consideration in this case because O’Brien was permitted to participate in the
program even though by his own admission he would not have been successful if he had
brought an action for the sexual abuse he allegedly suffered as a student as his claim
would have been barred by the statute of limitations.
For the foregoing reasons the order of March 14, 2012, will be affirmed.

We are well aware that there have been many cases in which allegations similar to those
that O’Brien makes with respect to child abuse have been made and we can take judicial
notice of that circumstance. See Fed. R. Evid. 201. Indeed, we have dealt with such
cases ourselves. See Elliot v. Archdiocese of New York, 682 F.3d 213 (3d Cir. 2012).
Accordingly, O’Brien’s underlying claim surely is not of an isolated nature. Thus, it is
important that the courts not discourage implicated institutions from developing
assistance and counseling programs.
5
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